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As with most countries, terrorism was far less of a concern for the Australian government 
prior to 2001 than it is today.
1
 Australians were not considered a target for terrorists overseas, 
and domestic acts of terrorism were generally aimed at officials of other countries, including 
Turkey, Iran, India and Israel.
2
 Yet Australia was not immune to the insidious spread of 
violent Islamist networks, which expanded around the globe during the 1980’s and ’90’s, and 
as an ally of the United States and key player in South East Asia it was swiftly identified as a 
legitimate focus for attacks. As in most Western countries a small number of Australian 
citizens became actively involved with Islamist extremists almost as soon as they came to 
their shores. A handful of these young men subsequently left to undertake paramilitary-style 
training at camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir at the turn of the millennium. Since 
then -and again paralleling developments elsewhere in the West- so-called ‘home-grown’ 




 The current article details Australia’s involvement in the ever-evolving violent 
Islamist movement via a statistical analysis of Islamist terrorism cases from the late 1980’s 
up until 2010. Working definitions are outlined, followed by a brief account of the Australian 
context and how Australia emerged as a target for Islamist extremists. The methodology for 
this study is then described prior to the statistical analysis of key variables. Summaries of the 
16 cases included in the analysis (and 9 cases excluded) are provided at the end of the article 
in chronological order. On the whole –and in line with previous research by Lentini and 
others
4
- it is found that whilst the Australian context is quite unique, quantitatively speaking 
and in terms of precise qualitative features (e.g. ethnic backgrounds), overall patterns in 
terrorist activity are comparable to other Western countries. 






Defining the Threat: Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism 
A major component of the contemporary security threat in Western countries is understood to 
be ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism, yet as with terrorism in general, a universally accepted 
definition of this term remains elusive. Islamist terrorists are by no means a homogenous 
group, although they share 3 core beliefs: 1) that Islam is under attack from the West, 2) that 
the world is divided into true Muslims versus infidels, and 3) that jihad is necessary violence 
against the oppressors of Islam.
5
 Key (assumed) features of specifically home-grown Islamist 
terrorism include: 1) that those responsible are long-term residents, if not citizens, of the 
country that they are operating in, 2) that they have radicalised in the West, and 3) that they 
are acting autonomously, with insubstantial ties to any (foreign) terrorist organisation.
6
  
In reality there is a great deal of variation in the characteristics of groups and 
individuals who become involved in this particular brand of violence, and there is not always 
a clear distinction between ‘home-grown’ and ‘international’/‘imported’ terrorism. Thus, 
rather than adopting a more or less exclusive analytical framework as a result of rigid 
definitions, it is prudent to examine the range of Islamist terrorist activity over time in any 
given context. There has been a general shift in Islamist militancy in Western countries, from 
being an imported and externally-focussed phenomenon, to being one that is endogenous and 
also aimed at perpetrating violence domestically. In order to understand how that shift has 
occurred and how contemporary HGIT is manifest in any given country, it is necessary to 
conduct an inclusive historical analysis.  
It is thus somewhat redundant to dwell on how HGIT is defined, and more useful to 
simply ask ‘how has Islamist terrorism developed, and how is it manifest today, in this 
particular country?’ This can be answered by examining the growth of militant Islamist 
networks and the involvement of citizens and residents of a given country in Islamist terrorist 





activity both at home and abroad (since decisions to fight abroad often begin at home). In this 
way the present article seeks to clarify our understanding of the relationship between Islamist 
terrorism and Australia.  
 
The Australian Context 
Analysts have previously drawn attention to comparatively disadvantaged economic and 
social conditions of Muslim diaspora communities as relevant to understanding potential 
grievances and therefore predisposing susceptibility to radicalisation.
7
 In 2006 the Australian 
population stood at 20.7 million people, around a quarter of whom were born overseas.
8
 The 
Muslim population was estimated at 340,393 (62% of whom were born overseas), 
constituting almost 2% of the overall population.
9
 Muslims in Australia are located mainly in 
Sydney and Melbourne
10
 and are ethnically diverse- in 2006 the main country of birth after 
Australia was Lebanon, representing 8.9% of the Muslim population, followed by Turkey 
(6.8%) and Afghanistan (4.7%).
11
 Despite this diversity it has been reported that overall 
Australian Muslims are “[a]ffected by a multiplicity of poor social and economic conditions, 
[leading them to] find a sense of belonging and self-worth within their own communities.”
12
  
In accordance with frustration-aggression explanations of terrorism, this implies that 
there is ample reason for grievances against Australia and thereby increased likelihood of 
susceptibility to radicalisation and violence. Nevertheless, rates of Islamist terrorist activity in 
Australia have been relatively low and it is simplistic to rely on explanations that focus solely 
on socioeconomic conditions and demographic variables. Of course foreign policy is also 
relevant, especially military support for US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia 
was quick to support the invasion of Iraq beginning in March 2003, maintaining combat 
troops there until June 2008,
13
 and as of November 2009 had 1,500 troops in Afghanistan, the 
largest contribution outside of Nato.
14
 However, while such factors undoubtedly contribute to 





understanding the Australian relationship with Islamist terrorism, there are many more details 
to consider. In particular it is important to examine the historical development of Islamist 
militancy in Australia over time, and to analyse the activities of individual terrorist 




Australia as a Target for Islamist Militants 
Australia was first named as a legitimate target for attack by Osama bin Laden on November 
3
rd
, 2001 and was referred to at least another five times by bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
over the next three years.
16
 Australian intervention in East Timor, beginning in 1999, was 
framed by Islamist extremists as an attack on Muslims
17
 and its negative image in their eyes 
predictably worsened as a result of collaborating in the United States’ ‘War on Terror.’ The 
presence of Australian troops in Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003 thus solidified 
the perception of Australia as an ‘enemy of Islam.’
18
 Accordingly, the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) observed that “[i]n the years from 2000 to 2005 inclusive, 




Of the successful attacks, 10 Australian citizens perished in the September 11
th
, 2001, 
attacks in the US and there were 88 Australians among the 202 killed in the Bali bombings of 
October 12, 2002.
20
 Another 3 were killed in separate incidents in Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 
2003 and 2004
21
 followed by the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta on September 
9, 2004, which killed 11 Indonesians.
22
 4 more Australians were killed in the second Bali 
bombings of October 1
st
, 2005, 2 died in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai,
23
 and 
another 3 were killed on July 17
th
, 2009, when the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in 
Jakarta were hit by suicide bombers.
24
 The rationale for such attacks was made most explicit 





in a web-posting claiming responsibility for the 2004 embassy bombing where it was 
declared that:  
 
“‘We, the Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia, have sent messages to the Christian government in 
Australia but it did not respond to us or to our call, yet still the Australian Government took 
part in the war against our brethren in Iraq and supported the invading forces. We have 
decided to bring Australia, which is considered one of the most vehement enemies of God and 
the religion of Islam, to account...this is only the first of many replies that are coming, God 
willing, which is why we advise all Australians in Indonesia to leave or else we will make it 
their graveyard. We also advise the Australian Government to withdraw its forces from Iraq, 
and if our demands are not met, we will direct many painful strikes against them, God 





It is notable that this was the only concrete attack aimed exclusively at an Australian target, 
whereas in most cases Australians have suffered as part of a strategy to attack symbols of the 
West more generally in South East Asia. In other instances (such as the plot to attack the 
Australian High Commission in Singapore, disrupted in 2001,
26
 and the alleged plot to attack 
the Australian embassy in Bangkok in 2003
27
) numerous other Western targets were given 
equal, if not greater consideration.  
Meanwhile, on the domestic stage Islamist extremists initially considered attacking 
Israeli and American interests and/or assassinating a prominent Melbourne-based Jewish 
businessman in 2000 in a plot involving Australian Jack Roche that was ultimately 
abandoned.
28
 Indications that Australia itself was being targeted at home surfaced in 2003 
when French authorities alerted their counterparts to the presence of Willie Brigitte in 





Sydney. Brigitte had received paramilitary training from Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and was 
being assisted by Australian citizens in researching possible attacks against the Lucas Heights 
nuclear reactor and military bases
29
 (see below).  
There were approximately 70 other ongoing terrorism investigations during 2003
30
 
and since then a small number of Australians actively involved in Islamist terrorism both at 
home and abroad have surfaced almost every year. It is of particular concern that there is a 
demonstrable and persistent desire amongst a minority of Australian residents to carry out 
terrorist attacks against their home country, as evidenced most clearly in the Operation 
Pendennis raids in Melbourne and Sydney in November 2005, and confirmed by the 
Operation Neath arrests in Melbourne in August 2009 (resulting in three convictions in 
December 2010). In a general sense, the emergent trend in Australia thus parallels 
developments elsewhere in the Western world since the invasion of Iraq, with an increasing 
range of countries having to deal with Islamist extremists, often long-term residents and 
citizens, seeking to perpetrate acts of violence and destruction in response to perceived 
injustices against Muslims.
31
 Greater understanding of the unique relationship between 
Australia and the ever-evolving global jihadi movement will be achieved via systematic 
examination of events. 
 
Methodology 
This study involves a statistical analysis of all cases of alleged Islamist terrorist activity, 
which adhere to the sampling criteria, involving Australian residents and citizens at home and 
abroad. It relies exclusively on open source materials. Firstly, an exhaustive search of press 
reports and online sources was conducted in order to identify all cases where terrorist 
involvement had been alleged. As much detail as possible was then collected for each case, 
relying primarily on online newspaper articles, and in some instances legal documents and 





other ‘official’ reports. A detailed chronological account of each case was constructed and 
details were entered into a database using Excel. A decision was then made whether or not to 
include each case in the analysis (see below for brief case synopses).  
To be included in the sample, cases had to involve individuals who espoused rhetoric 
or justification for their actions in terms of Sunni Islamist, jihadi ideology and were involved 
in one or more related activities including: 1) Promoting jihadi ideology, 2) Recruiting others 
to the jihad, 3) Engaging in paramilitary-style terrorist training, 4) Planning acts of violence 
in furtherance of jihad. Individuals do not have to have been convicted of any terrorism 
offence to be included in the analysis, nor do they have to have been part of any identifiable 
terrorist organisation. However, the allegations against them must have resulted in criminal 
charges being filed and/or have been consistently reported up until the time of writing with a 
level of detail that leaves little doubt that the individuals in question did in fact carry out the 
alleged behaviour. So, for example, although charges against Izhar Ul-Haque (see below) 
were dropped, this was because evidence was deemed inadmissible due to the conduct of 
ASIO officers rather than because the fact that he trained with LeT in Pakistan was called 
into question.
32
 His actions thus remain relevant for understanding Islamist militancy in 
Australia. 
Non-Sunni Islamist cases were excluded as were those where charges were dropped 
or individuals were found not guilty because allegations were not supported by the available 
evidence (as opposed to being for technical/legal reasons). This applies to Mamdouh Habib; 
Hany Taha, Bassam Raad, Majed Raad and Shoue Hammoud; Hassan Kalache and Jill 
Courtney; John Amundsen; Warye Kanie; Muhammad and Abdullah Ayub; Ahmed Elomar, 
Muhammad Basal, Hussein Elomar and Bassam El Sayed; Mohamed Haneef; Yacqub 
Khayre and Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed. One other individual (Muhamed Mubayyid) was 
excluded because the crimes he was convicted of –tax fraud- do not shed any real light on the 





nature of his personal involvement in violent Islamism; similarly, six others were excluded 
because sufficient information was lacking to be able to confirm their involvement in 
terrorism (namely, Abdul Zoud, Matthew Stewart, Marat Sumolsky, Ibrahim Sabouh; Walid 
Osman Mohamed and Hussein Hashi Hemed Farah). 
Included cases were analysed according to variables identified as relevant from 
reviews of the literature on home-grown terrorism. These included demographic variables, 
presence of leadership within groups, foreign organisational contact, domestic vs. overseas 
focus of activities, the invasion of Iraq as a significant point in time, and legal outcomes of 
cases. 
Despite the potential utility of this approach, limitations must also be acknowledged. 
The present study is based on open-source information that is varying in reliability and often 
lacking in detail. Aside from the methodological problems this creates (meaning that the 
conclusions drawn here are necessarily tentative) it means that the overall picture is skewed 
according to which cases present more data. Nevertheless, terrorism researchers routinely 
rely on open-source material, and previous studies utilising similar data have shed light on 
the demographic background
33






Only the tip (and most extreme point) of the iceberg of Islamist activity within 
Australia has been covered here; however this is an initial step towards more thorough 
research, which will require more in-depth examination of particular social contexts and 
communities. Finally it must be re-emphasised that the aim of this study has been to cover all 
cases of alleged participation in Islamist terrorist activities involving Australians and people 
living in Australia. The subsequent report should be treated as an analysis of publicly 
available information and has no bearing on legal judgements as to the guilt or innocence of 
named individuals.  







In all there have been 25 publicised cases of suspected Islamist terrorist activity involving 
Australians (totalling 61 individuals).
36
 25 individuals (see above) were removed from the 
analysis as the original allegations against them have been disproven or cannot be confirmed 
with any certainty. 
This brings the total number of cases of Australian Islamist terrorism to 16 (including 
36 individuals). These are: 1. Abdul Rahim and Abdul Rahman Ayub (deemed to be highly 
significant to the growth of violent Islamism in Australia) 2. Jack Roche, 3. Noorpolat 
Abdulla, 4. David Hicks, 5. Jack Thomas, 6. Zaky Mallah, 7. Izhar Ul-Haque, 8. Willie 
Brigitte and Faheem Lodhi (classed as one case) 9. Belal Khazaal, 10. Feiz Mohammed, 11. 
The Melbourne ‘Pendennis’ group, 12. The Sydney ‘Pendennis group’, 13. Tallaal Adrey, 14. 
Ahmed Ali, 15. Omar Hadba, and 16. the ‘Neath’ group (recently convicted but not yet 
sentenced at the time of writing). 
 
Table 1: Age, group size and nationality of Australian Islamist terrorists. 
 
 *Around time of known first involvement relating to offence and at time of arrest. (n=40). 
 **Non-Australian heritage. 
 ***Greatly underestimated since most ‘individual’ cases were part of much larger networks. 
 
Table 1 shows that the average age of individuals (rounded to the nearest whole 
number) around the first known time that they began to actively pursue or promote violent 





jihad was 28 years old and at the time of arrest was 29. 65% were aged 30 or under at the 
time of arrest, the youngest was aged 20 and the oldest was 47. By comparison Sageman 
reported an average age for those ‘joining the jihad’ of 25.7 years based on a global sample 
of 172 individuals, and Bakker reported an average age of 27.3 at the time of arrest based on 
a European sample of more than 200.
37
 The Australian average arrest-age of 29 is thus 




More recently Sageman has suggested that the average age of jihadi recruits in 
Europe and Canada has “dramatically decreased” down to about 20 years old (based on a 
sample of those detained since 2006).
39
 He divides the global Islamist movement into three 
waves: those who joined in the 1980’s and fought the Soviets in Afghanistan; those who 
joined in the 1990’s; and those who became involved after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
40
 
Studies of jihadis in Denmark and the Netherlands support Sageman’s claim that recruits are 
getting younger, a trend which appears to be facilitated by the growing accessibility of 
violent Islamist messages on the Internet.
41
 By dividing the Australian sample according to 
whether individuals became active in the pre- vs. post-Iraq era (defined here as prior to 2003 
and 2003 onwards), the respective average ages at the time of arrest are 31 and 29. Hence the 
slightly higher average age of Australian jihadis is maintained, although there is some 
indication that this is decreasing in absolute terms, thus showing conformity to global trends. 
 Table 1 also shows that 94% of the sample are Australian citizens, 86% are of non-
Australian heritage (more than half being Lebanese) and 57% of individuals for whom data is 
available were born in Australia. The majority had also lived in Australia for more than 10 
years prior to taking part in terror-related activity. This is in accordance with observations 
that contemporary Islamist terrorists in the West tend to be citizens and long-term residents of 
Western countries. Hence Silber and Bhatt describe typical jihadis as being male Muslims 









An analysis of Leiken and Brooke’s dataset of 373 Islamist terrorists shows that 18% 
were Western-born from 1990-2001, compared to 24% from 2002 to 2004, illustrating an 
increase in the numbers of ‘home-grown’ terrorists over time.
43
 Again dividing the current 
sample into pre- vs. post-Iraq cases further reveals that 36% (4/11) of pre-Iraq individuals 
were Australian-born compared to 72% (16/22) of post-Iraq individuals for whom there is 
data. While the exact percentages may be skewed by the low numbers involved, clearly more 
people born in Australia have become involved in Islamist terrorism over time.  
Additional demographic information would preferably be included here also, such as 
religious background, educational achievement, occupation, marital status, criminal record 





of the most comprehensive empirical studies of Islamist militants). Unfortunately there is 
insufficient information available at present to give an accurate portrayal of these variables in 
the current sample. Of 38 individuals, 5 (12%) were converts to Islam but little is known 
about the religious background of the rest of the sample, except to say that several individuals 
–in line with other research
46
- showed a significant increase in religiousness around the time 
of getting involved in jihadi activities. Currently available figures on educational 
achievement here show that 3 out of 20 (15%) of individuals had completed university-level 
education. 42% of Sageman’s original sample had finished university, compared to 30% 
(14/47 for whom information was available) of Bakker’s sample.
47
 In later research Sageman 
observes that educational achievement has declined with each successive wave of Islamist 
terrorists.
48
 As more reliable information emerges the Australian picture will be clarified, 
however, it is suffice to say at present that most have not progressed much further than high 





school or college, although there is a wide range of educational attainment represented, 
including vocational qualifications. 
With regards to occupation, just 5 of 24 (21%) of individuals in the Australian sample 
for whom there was information can be classed as having a skilled occupation, the majority 
being semi- or unskilled. Although based on incomplete data these figures are quite different 
to Sageman’s original study in which 57 of 134 (43%) had skilled occupations.
49
 However it 
is much closer to Bakker’s findings in Europe that more than 70% (of 103) held semi- or 
unskilled jobs,
50
 and is also in line with Sageman’s assertion that there has been a gradual 
decline in socioeconomic status of jihadi terrorists.
51
  
Marital status is also of interest, partly because it seems so counterintuitive for 
someone with family responsibilities to get involved in terrorism, and yet this is not 
uncommon. Sageman found that 83 out of 114 (73%) were married,
52
 while Bakker found 
that 39 out of 66 (59%) were married at the time of their involvement, with another 8 
previously divorced
53
 (although Bakker does emphasise that many on whom there was no 
specific information appeared to be single, implying that marital status is mostly only 
reported when a relationship is present). In the current sample, 17 of 23 (74%) of individuals 
on whom there was data were married (including 1 third-time marriage and 1 marriage of 
convenience) and 2 others had previously been married and were either separated or 
divorced. Most who were married also had children. As in Bakker’s study the percentage may 
be inflated due to the lack of available data, however it clearly confirms that having a wife 
and family does not protect against terrorist involvement. 
Since terrorism is a form of crime, criminal history is another factor worth 
considering. Sageman reported that around 25% of his first sample had a petty criminal 
record relating to crimes such as forgery, document trafficking, fraud and drug dealing,
54
 and 
more recently asserts that criminality is more common as a form of fund-raising without 





being able to rely on organisations such as al-Qaeda Central for handouts.
55
 Bakker likewise 
reported that around a quarter of his sample had been previously convicted in court for a 
criminal offence, mostly for relatively petty crimes.
56
 There is currently only information 
available for 11 individuals in the current sample, of whom 2 (18%) had unrelated criminal 
records prior to their jihadi activities, involving fraud, burglary, criminal damage, theft and 
intentionally causing injury (the latter four all committed by Fadl Sayadi
57
). Pending more 
information the Australian sample thus seems to confirm that only a minority of Islamist 
terrorists tend to have criminal records, and these are varied and relatively minor. However, it 
is also relevant that Mohamed Elomar (of the Sydney Pendennis group) utilised his 
connections to the criminal underworld in order to try to obtain weapons, despite having no 
prior record himself.
58
 Criminal associations should not therefore be regarded as 
insignificant. 
Lastly, to address mental illness as a possible contributory factor behind terrorist 
activity, it is now well-established that this is not a useful explanation for why people become 
terrorists.
59
 Sageman has roundly criticised the notion that Islamist terrorists are suffering 
from psychological disorder.
60
 He found that only 4 of 61 (7%) of his original dataset showed 
any evidence of childhood conduct disorder,
61
 and then from an updated sample of more than 
500, only another 4 (<1%) exhibited signs of psychotic symptoms.
62
 Likewise Bakker reports 
that only 11 in his sample appeared to be suffering from mental illness, but qualified this 
statement by the fact that 4 of these had become ill after their arrest.
63
 Among Australian 
jihadists (for whom there is specific information on just 12 individuals) there are no 
confirmed cases of mental illness where some form of medical/psychological intervention 
was involved prior to their arrest. Izzydeen Atik of the Melbourne Pendennis group had been 
claiming benefits for a psychiatric illness for some time, however the sentencing judge in that 
case was of the opinion that these claims were fraudulent to the extent that it was “probably 







 The most serious known instance that appears to be genuine is that of 
Khaled Sharrouf of the Sydney Pendennis group, who was deemed to be suffering from a 
“serious mental disorder” at the time of offending but was later found fit to enter a plea of 
guilty.
65
 In a separate case, one psychologist opined that Zaky Mallah may have been 
suffering from Adjustment Disorder, however another psychologist disagreed. In the 
remaining cases any previous psychological distress appears to have been relatively minor, 
and any current, more serious symptoms the result of incarceration. As with marriage, where 
there is no history to report it is simply not reported, thus making it a reasonably reliable 
assumption to say that, as previous studies have shown, mental disorder is not prevalent here 
either.  
Returning to the final portions of Table 1, it is shown that the average group size of 
Australian terrorism cases is less than 3 people. However, this is potentially very misleading 
since most cases (with the notable exception of Zaky Mallah) involved a wider support 
network which played an integral –sometimes controlling- role in their radicalisation and 
operational functioning. Hence in 77% (10/13) cases involving ‘lone’ individuals or pairs the 
available information confirms or at least strongly suggests that the persons involved were in 
fact part of a network that was significant to their offending behaviour. The cases not counted 
as part of a network include Zaky Mallah, Feiz Mohammed and Belal Khazaal (and the last 
two cases were most definitely immersed in wider networks even if they acted alone as far as 
their documented activities go).  
Only three of the Australian cases can be considered groups with relatively finite 
boundaries, namely the two Operation Pendennis groups (each with 9 members) and the 
Neath group, (involving 3 confirmed individuals). These figures compare to an average group 
size from Bakker’s European sample of operational jihadis of 8 members.
66
 On the face of it, 
distinct groups of terrorists forming in Australia are thus a rarity, especially in comparison to 





other parts of the world; however, it is even rarer for the functioning of individuals and dyads 




Table 2: Leadership, external influence and domestic vs. overseas aims in cases of 
Australian Islamist terrorism. 
 
* Leaders have only been clearly identified in the two Operation Pendennis groups. Information 
suggesting possible leaders within the Operation Neath group has yet to be confirmed and is thus 
presently excluded. 
** Cases include: the Ayub twins, Roche, Hicks, Thomas, Brigitte and Lodhi, and Ul-Haque.  Note that 
these figures count remaining (unknown) cases as having no handlers. 
*** Cases include: Roche, Mallah, Brigitte & Lodhi, Pendennis, Neath. 
 
Table 2 shows that there have been clearly identifiable within-group leaders in only two of 
the Australian cases so far. These were the Operation Pendennis groups, which in fact were 
interlinked and collectively led by Abdul Nacer Benbrika, although each group had its own 
day-to-day ‘operational’ leaders. It was suggested that El Sayed and Fattal played leading 
roles in the Operation Neath group, and later that an individual on the run in East Africa, 
named as Hussein Farah, may have been the overall ‘mastermind’
67
 but these details have yet 
to be confirmed and so this case has been excluded from the analysis. On the face of it this 
would seem to refute Silber and Bhatt’s,
68
 and also Nesser’s
69
 contention that top-down 





influence plays a key role in the formation and direction of groups of Islamist terrorists in the 
West.  
However, to suggest that none of the remaining cases have involved some kind of 
leadership would be inaccurate. There is little information available about how exactly 
individuals in the sample radicalised, and to what extent they were influenced by others or 
acted independently. Nevertheless, external ‘handlers’, i.e. associates of individuals included 
in the sample who played facilitating and controlling roles concerning those individuals’ 
actions, can be identified in at least six other cases. These are the Ayub twins, who answered 
to Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdulla Sungkar; Jack Roche, controlled by numerous others 
including Abdul Rahim Ayub and Abu Hafs; David Hicks, who was an agent of LeT and al-
Qaeda; Jack Thomas, influenced by Abu Bakar Bashir and by Khaled bin Attash; Willie 
Brigitte and Faheem Lodhi, who were seemingly influenced by the mysterious ‘Sajid’ in 
Pakistan; and finally Izhar Ul-Haque, who was apparently guided by Faheem Lodhi and then 
trained with LeT. Furthermore, the 40% figure may be an underestimation of external 
influence since it counts unknown cases as non-occurrences. In reality the cases of Noorpolat 
Abdulla, Tallaal Adrey, Ahmed Ali and Omar Hadba (possibly the Neath group as well) may 
all have involved considerable levels of external facilitation, in some cases verging on 
control. 
 The significance of links external to these groups is also illustrated by examining 
contact with foreign terrorist groups or organisations. More than half (55%) of individuals for 
whom there is adequate data are alleged to have trained with, been part of, or at least been in 
communication with, foreign organised terrorists. Moreover, if this is examined according to 
cases rather than individuals, 88% (14/16) of Australian cases have included members with 
foreign organisational affiliation. The only two cases deemed not to have made foreign 





contact are those of Zaky Mallah (who was certainly acting alone) and Feiz Mohammed (who 
is nevertheless deeply involved in wider Islamist networks and left Australia for Lebanon).  
On the one hand the Australian sample reflects given wisdom about home-grown 
terrorism in that it is primarily made up of Australian citizens and long-term residents. On the 
other hand, the rather high levels of contact with organised overseas terrorists contradicts the 
assumption that Western-based Islamist terrorists are mostly removed from foreign terrorist 
entities. Then again, despite the apparent commonality of communicating, training with, or in 
some cases fighting for jihadi organisations, for those individuals who stayed in/ returned to 
Australia the role of those organisations (JI, al-Qaeda, LeT and al-Shabaab) seems to have 
been at most one of encouragement and/or limited facilitation rather than substantial support 
or outright control. In the most serious domestic cases (Pendennis and Neath) the available 
information thus far indicates that these groups acted with autonomy despite instances of 
organisational contact. Higher levels of control resulting from organisational affiliation 
appear likely only where individuals were apparently absorbed into foreign conflicts and did 
not return home (Abdulla, Hicks, Adrey, Ali and Hadba). It would thus appear that while 
organisational contact is unexpectedly high, levels of autonomy also remain high, especially 
on the domestic stage. 
 Finally, Table 2 shows that it is a minority of cases (38% or 6/16) that have involved 
an explicitly domestic focus. Even then it is important to qualify those cases. Jack Roche was 
planning to hit targets in Australia, albeit symbols of the US and Israel, before giving up. 
Mallah’s idea was to target government officials (specifically former Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer and former ASIO Director General Dennis Richardson
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) but he was 
acting alone based on personal grievances and might arguably even be excluded from the 
analysis altogether. Brigitte and Lodhi showed a more wilful desire to carry out attacks, 
focussing on possible infrastructure or military targets. The Pendennis groups were also eager 





to carry out attacks at home but despite speculation the most concrete information about their 
possible target(s) relates to one instance of surveillance at the Lucas Heights nuclear research 
facility (thought to be a low-impact target). Lastly, the Neath group are alleged to have been 
planning a fidayen operation at an Australian military base.  
What is striking about these domestically-focussed cases is that no definite target was 
ever identified (the closest being Jack Roche), relatively few weapons were acquired and very 
little was accomplished as far as actually manufacturing explosives is concerned. There is 
also nothing more than conjecture to suggest that purely civilian targets were ever seriously 
considered by any domestic Australian terrorists (excepting Roche’s surveillance of foreign 
embassies and a Jewish businessman). This stands out in contrast to the eagerness displayed 
by Islamist terrorists in Europe and North America to attack soft, civilian targets, which has 
been repeatedly demonstrated in both foiled and successful attacks. Hence most Australian 
cases of Islamist terrorist activity have involved overseas aims, and among domestically-
focussed cases potential targets have primarily been restricted to infrastructure or military 
sites. 
 
Table 3a: Organisational contact in Australian cases of Islamist terrorism before and 
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 
 
Given that organisational autonomy is thought to have increased as a consequence of 
counter-terrorism efforts after 9/11, and that the growth of Western HGIT was spurred on by 





the invasion of Iraq, it makes sense to examine whether there is more or less contact with 
foreign terrorist organisations in the pre- vs. post-Iraq periods. Table 3a shows that 11 
Australians, constituting 9 cases, were actively involved in Islamist terrorism prior to 2003, 
compared to 25 individuals constituting 7 cases (and thus larger identifiable groups) after 
2003. 10 of 11 (91%) of individuals, or 8 out of 9 (89%) of cases in the pre-Iraq era had 
contact with foreign terrorist organisations (assuming that Noorpolat Abdulla was indeed part 
of a larger network as alleged by Kazakh authorities, only Mallah stands out as having no 
international connections).  
This compares to 8 out of 22 (36%) of individuals for whom there was available 
information, or 6 out of 7 (86%) of cases in the post-Iraq era. Absolute numbers of people 
making contact with foreign terrorist organisations thus seem to have changed little (10 vs. 8) 
although with more people getting involved after the invasion of Iraq, the relative percentage 
has decreased. As far as cases go, there have been numerically fewer since 2003 but the 
relative percentage of cases where at least some members have had organisational contact has 
remained high.  
Having said this it is important to note that the pre- vs. post-Iraq division is not easy 
to make since there is some disparity between when individuals became involved with violent 
Islamists and when they began specific offence-related behaviour. Specifically, the Operation 
Pendennis individuals are counted in the post-Iraq era since their offence-planning did not 
appear to begin in earnest until sometime in 2004. And yet the four individuals reported to 
have trained with terrorists overseas (Kent, Mohamed Elomar, Khaled Cheikho and Moustafa 
Cheikho) did so prior to 2003. The post-Iraq case figures are thus somewhat inflated as a 
result. Adjusting the statistics to account for this, the number of individuals with 
organisational contact in the pre-Iraq era goes up to 14, compared to just 4 since then. This 





adds support to the observation that it is now more difficult to make contact with foreign 
terrorist organisations. Table 3b illustrates the adjusted individual figures. 
 
Table 3b: Numbers of Australian individuals with foreign organisational contact before and 
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (adjusted for when individuals trained as opposed to when 
they became operational). 
 
 
Temporarily putting aside these analytical issues it is also useful to examine the qualitative 
nature of organisational affiliation before and after Iraq. In the pre-Iraq period the Ayub twins 
occupied leadership positions in JI. Roche received money, training, advice and direction 
from JI and al-Qaeda. Hicks received training and participated in combat. Thomas received 
training and money. Izhar Ul-Haque trained with LeT. The Frenchman Willie Brigitte 
received training and direction, while Lodhi maintained communication with LeT. Moving 
into the post-Iraq period for when cases began, four members of the Pendennis network had 
previously trained with Pakistani terrorist organisations (prior to 2003). Tallaal Adrey was 
allegedly a member of the Peninsula Lions in 2005. Ahmed Ali died fighting in 2006, 
presumably as part of a Somali terrorist group. Omar Hadba was accused of being a member 
of Fatah al-Islam and being actively involved in the insurgency in Lebanon during 2007. 
Finally in 2009, Saney Aweys is said to have acted as a recruiter for al-Shabaab (meanwhile 
one of his acquitted associates –excluded from the analysis- was alleged to have trained with 
them and sought operational/ spiritual advice).
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 Prior to 2003 it was thus more common for individuals to be acting as agents (in some 
cases leaders) of foreign terrorist organisations within Australia. This applies to the Ayubs, 
Roche, potentially to Thomas and Ul-Haque, and almost certainly to Brigitte and Lodhi. The 
level of support was quite substantial in some of these cases too, with both Roche and 
Thomas receiving money to facilitate travel and (potentially) for planning of attacks. The four 
Pendennis men who trained with JeM and with LeT do not appear to have received any 
further support from these organisations. They trained between 1999-2002 but did not 
become operational until around 2004, after the invasion of Iraq. Their experiences in this 
regard are thus relevant to both the pre- and post-Iraq periods and illustrate the fact that 
organisational contact can be fleeting and should not be assumed to be ongoing. As for the 
remaining post-Iraq cases, they are mostly examples of involvement in foreign conflicts. The 
final case, Operation Neath, requires more information but at present suggests the renewed 
possibility of organisational agents within Australia (if indeed Aweys was a bona fide al-
Shabaab recruiter) and yet an advisory, rather than more active supporting or controlling role 
of foreign organisations.  
Overall, in terms of organisational affiliation the Australian sample does not 
contradict the notion that home-grown terrorists are largely autonomous. Contact with 
established overseas entities is still sought after (including an increasing range of countries, 
most notably Somalia) and is achieved to varying degrees. Since 2003 the level of direct 
support and control –especially ongoing support after training for those who return to 
Australia- appears to have diminished. Nevertheless, in cases where there is a more 
substantial history of contact with foreign terrorists, this may be indicative of a more serious 
threat to national and international security.  These patterns conform with what is happening 
in North America and Europe, where foreign travel remains popular among jihadis willing to 
go to an expanding list of countries including Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia in addition to 





traditional destinations such as Pakistan. At the same time it is rare for such Western home-
grown terrorists to be considered agents or ‘real’ members of foreign organisations. 
 
Table 4: Legal outcomes of Australian Islamist terror cases. 
 
 
Legal outcomes are a final variable of interest. The vast majority of Australian jihadis 
were charged with terrorism offences. Those never charged, or where the case was dropped, 
include the Ayub twins, Ul-Haque, Feiz Mohammed and Ahmed Ali. Terror, but not 
criminal, charges were ultimately also dropped in the cases of Jack Thomas and Zaky Mallah. 
A no-verdict was originally returned for Shane Kent although he later pleaded guilty to being 
a member of a terrorist organisation and making a document in preparation for an act of 
terrorism and was sentenced to 4-and-a-half years.
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 Excluding one case pending (Omar 
Hadba) of 30 people charged, 28 (93%) were, or are due to be, sentenced on terrorism 
charges. The average sentence on terrorism charges ranged from a minimum 4 years 
(delivered for Tallaal Adrey in Kuwait) to a maximum 28 years (for Mohamed Elomar in 
Sydney), giving an average sentence among 20 individuals of 13.65 years. This is slightly 
higher than the average sentence in the US, which is reported to be 12.7 years
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 (based on a 
sample of 370) but the Australian sample is somewhat skewed by the high sentences given in 
the Sydney Pendennis trial and in any case the difference is minimal. The legal penalties for 
terrorism in Australia thus appear to be comparable to those in the United States. 
 





Summary and Conclusion 
The present study has presented an analysis of the unique history of Australian involvement 
in Islamist terrorism over the past 30 years. Beginning in the 1980’s JI began to encroach 
upon Australian territory. Partly as a consequence of this, and apparently also as a result of 
the adventurousness of young men such as David Hicks, combined with simmering global 
conflicts during the 1990’s, a (relatively small) number of Australian men travelled abroad to 
train with al-Qaeda and affiliated organisations. For the most part these individuals engaged 
in paramilitary training and sometimes combat overseas but showed little motivation to attack 
their own country. 
 Beginning around 2003 there was evidence of more serious intent to carry out attacks 
within Australia, albeit from individuals who were affiliates of overseas organisations and 
were not Australian, or at least had not grown up there (Brigitte and Lodhi). Accordingly, 
speaking in 2003, the then-AFP counter-terrorism chief Ben McDevitt remarked, “I think it is 
fair to say we don't have home-grown terrorists in this country... as yet... But what we 
definitely do have is people here who are sympathetic to causes offshore.”
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 However, the situation changed in the post-Iraq invasion period with the discovery of 
the Pendennis network in 2004 (arrests taking place in November 2005), which featured 
mostly life-long Australian residents plotting to carry out attacks in their home-country. Since 
then, aside from some false-alarms which turned out to be relatively isolated individuals who 
cannot be considered Islamist terrorists (and who were thus excluded from the analysis) 
Australian involvement in violent Islamist activities has been mostly limited to overseas 
countries including Kuwait, Somalia and Lebanon. Most recently, the Operation Neath 
convictions are confirmation of the fact there is nevertheless a persistent ‘home-grown’ jihadi 
element within Australia.  





The current statistical analysis of Australian terror cases reaffirms previous research 
by Lentini
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 (an examination of the Melbourne and Sydney Pendennis groups), confirming a 
profile that is at once unique and yet reflective of worldwide Western trends. The prevalence 
of Lebanese heritage among home-grown terrorists is unique to Australia and indicative of its 
immigration history in much the same way as Pakistanis dominate in the UK or Moroccans in 
Spain. These individuals are mostly long-term Australian residents or citizens of quite 
unremarkable backgrounds, thus paralleling jihadis in North America and Europe. The 
average Australian age is slightly older than other (larger) samples have revealed but shows a 
decrease since the invasion of Iraq, which is in line with other analysts’ observations. 
The average group size among the current sample is relatively small but this can be 
deceptive since the majority of individuals were very much part of wider networks that were 
important to their terrorist activities. Contact with foreign terrorist organisations has also 
remained quite prevalent even in the post-9/11 and post-Iraq eras. This is surprising given the 
common general emphasis on a lack of organisational affiliation. However, it does appear 
that the nature of organisational contact has changed over time from being more involved 
(supportive and sometimes controlling) to being more inspirational (offering training and 
advice only). This is in line with commentaries of HGIT in the West more generally. Finally, 
legal statistics also show similarity to other Western countries, with most individuals being 
charged and sentenced in relation to terrorism legislation, while others have been convicted 
under ordinary criminal law only. 
The biggest difference between Australia and countries such as the UK and US relates 
to the size of the problem. There have been just two serious domestic plots to carry out 
attacks within Australia since 2003, with nearly a four year gap in between when those arrests 
took place. By comparison, multiple plots have been discovered in the post-Iraq era with 
alarming regularity each year in both the UK and US. Given a larger population size, the rate 





of Islamist terrorism in the US is less than that in Europe, a difference which has commonly 
been explained in terms of better integration of the Muslim population (supported by the fact 
that America’s Muslims are largely on an equal socioeconomic footing to the rest of the 
population, while European Muslims are often significantly disadvantaged).
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 Canada and 
Australia have also been depicted as ‘countries of immigration’ which encourage integration 
and are therefore thought to have some protection against the likelihood of terrorism. More 
recently the view that the US has been somewhat immune to Islamist terrorism at home has 
been called into question as plots continue to surface. This has been posited to be the result of 
continued and escalating participation in the ‘war on terror’ as 30,000 more American troops 
have been committed to go to Afghanistan while US military operations elsewhere also 
continue.
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 In light of this, Australia’s decision of May 2009 to send an extra 450 troops to 
Afghanistan
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 may go some way to explaining the persistence, yet smaller-scale, of Islamist 
terrorism in Australia. Moreover, although Australians have so far demonstrated more 
interest in terrorist activities abroad it is likely that additional plots to attack at home will be 
discovered in the future.    
There is a great deal to be said for adopting an exhaustive chronological approach to 
understanding Islamist terrorism in any given country. It avoids relying on assumptions based 
on more general observations that do not take into account the unique context of the country 
in question. It enables analysis of changes over time. It allows comparison of particular 
contexts with general trends, and as more country case studies emerge will enable cross-
comparison not only of emerging patterns of terrorist activity but of counter-terrorism efforts 
as well.  
The current study does of course have its limitations. Primary among these are the 
reliance on open source materials for data, which frequently omit details and are of dubious 
reliability and validity. Moreover, it represents little more than the tip of the iceberg of 





Islamist militancy and there is likely to be a great deal more going on than is revealed here. 
There is thus a great deal of room for expansion and refinement of the current study. One way 
of expanding this approach that would be useful from a law-enforcement perspective would 
be to conduct a more detailed geographic analysis of ‘hot-spots’ of jihadi activity. Although 
it is clear that Sydney and Melbourne have played host to most of Australia’s violent 
Islamists, there is a need to examine particular suburbs, communities and even certain 
mosques within these (and other) cities. 
Other areas in desperate need of more in-depth examination are specific pathways of 
radicalisation and patterns of operational behaviour. What different individuals’ life-
circumstances were before getting involved, how they met people already involved, how they 
progressed socially and ideologically? Indeed, a study by Porter and Kebbell (which also 
utilised open-source materials) recently addressed some of these questions and found that the 
Australian data is congruent with studies of home-grown Islamist terrorists overseas.
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Moving onto operational characteristics (in cases where this occurred), questions remain such 
as how individuals made contact with terrorists overseas, what factors affected their choice of 
focussing on action abroad or at home, why they chose –or discounted- particular targets for 
attack, and how they went about conducting surveillance and other preparations?  
A great deal has been said about the increasing impact that the Internet has had on 
spreading jihadist ideology and propaganda, opening up global communication networks and 
acting as a resource library for gathering intelligence and know-how for conducting terrorist 
operations.
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 In the current study the Internet has so far been explicitly mentioned in 9 out of 
16 (56%) of cases, namely those of Roche, Hicks, Thomas, Brigitte and Lodhi, Ul-Haque, 
Khazaal, Feiz Mohammed and the Pendennis groups. Yet more information is needed- 
especially as to whether the Internet is serving as people’s first point of contact with 





extremist ideology and whether it is being used to make social contacts both locally and 
internationally.  
Finally, it is necessary to carry out follow-up research with the growing number of 
currently imprisoned individuals and those who have been released in order to not only gain 
richer accounts of their past involvement but also to understand how (if at all) they have 
changed. This is particularly relevant to potentially developing early intervention programs as 
well as rehabilitative programs of ‘deradicalisation’ for fledgling and more ‘fully-developed’ 
Islamist radicals as a way of expanding counter-terrorism efforts in line with contemporary 
innovations around the world. 
Although there is much room for improvement, the potential benefits of conducting 
this kind of research outweigh the drawbacks of the available data and promise to make a 
significant contribution to our understanding of Islamist terrorism. The present report is thus 
intended as a step in the right direction upon which future research can build. 
 
Islamist Terrorism and Australia: A Chronological Summary of Cases  
The following case summaries very briefly chart the arrival of Islamist militants in Australia 
and the subsequent involvement of Australians in violent jihad from the 1980’s though to 
2009. The cases are presented according to the chronological order in which they began as 
opposed to when they became public knowledge. This is judged on the basis of the first 
known overt action taken in support of violent Islamist extremism with an identifiable link to 
Australia and in direct relation to the offences which individuals were charged with or are 
otherwise alleged to have committed. Date-ranges in brackets indicate the duration of active 
jihadi involvement up until the case conclusion (via arrest, death or other circumstances). 
All cases involving Australian residents and citizens where a connection to Islamist 
terrorism has been alleged were originally covered in as much detail as possible, thus 





enabling an appreciation of the entire range of activities and issues relating to this 
phenomenon. Cases included in the analysis are presented first, followed by cases excluded. 
 
Cases Included in the Analysis (n = 16) 
 




 Deliberate attempt to expand operations in Australia by Jemaah Islamiyah 
 National and international networking and cooperation 
 Seemingly dissipated since 2002 
 
Abdul Rahim Ayub, a close associate of Abdulla Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, came to 
Australia in the early 1980’s in order to run what was later known as the ‘Mantiqi 4’ region 
of Jemaah Islamiyah. Based in Sydney and married for a time to Rabiyah Hutchinson, he was 
joined for two years by his brother Abdul Rahman, from 1997 to 1999. Following a dispute 
with locals they moved to Perth early in 1998. During his time in Australia Abdul Rahim 
focussed on proselytising, organising visits by Sungkar and Bashir, almost certainly 
fundraising, and networking with other prominent Islamists (including controversial 
Melbourne cleric Mohammed Omran and Belal Khazaal). JI are reported to have engaged in 
firearms training within Australia, and Abdul Rahim also helped arrange for new recruits 
such as Jack Roche to go overseas for training. Rahim left Australia in the wake of the 2002 
Bali bombings. 
 









 Organisational affiliation & top-down control 
 Overseas travel & training 
 Given $8,000 to finance operation 
 Planned domestic attacks on US/Israeli targets 
 Use of Internet for researching materials 
 Convicted in 2004 
 
Roche came to Sydney from the UK in 1978. He converted to Islam in 1992 and became part 
of Abdul Rahim’s congregation. Early in 2000 he underwent jihadi training at an al-Qaeda 
camp in Afghanistan and was dispatched back to Australia in the summer by Abu Hafs and 
Saif al-Adl. He attempted to recruit others and conducted surveillance of Israeli embassies 
but Abdul Rahim and colleagues discouraged him from further pursuing the plan and it was 
abandoned.  
 




 Australian citizen of Uighur heritage 
 Moved to Kazakhstan 
 Arrested during broad round-up of suspects 
 First Australian convicted on terror-charges after 9/11 
 
Abdulla grew up in Adelaide and attended the same mosque as David Hicks. In 1998 he 
emigrated to Kazakhstan and in 2000 was arrested as part of a crackdown on Uighurs, 
following the death of two police officers. Two grenades bearing his prints were allegedly 





found in his home and in October 2001 he was convicted in a (re)trial in closed court and 
sentenced to 15 years. 
 




 Foreign organisational affiliation 
 Overseas training and combat 
 First person to be convicted at Guantanamo Bay 
 Released in Australia in 2007 
 
Born in Adelaide in 1975, Hicks left Australia in 1990. He joined the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) in 1998/1999, then returned to Australia before leaving for Pakistan in 
November 1999. He trained and fought with Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), then trained with al-
Qaeda in January 2001. He fought for the Taliban until his capture in December the same 
year. 
 




 Foreign organisational affiliation and overseas training 
 Was given $3,800 
 Also given a phone number and email address to maintain contact 
 Detained en route back to Australia 
 Convicted on non-terrorism charges in 2008 
 





Thomas became involved in Islamism through Mohammed Omran’s mosque in Melbourne. 
In March 2001 he travelled to Afghanistan and trained at al-Qaeda’s Camp Farouq alongside 
two other known Australians. He was arrested and questioned by Pakistani police returning to 
Australia in January 2003. He was arrested back home in November 2004, was cleared of 
terrorism charges but convicted for falsifying his passport and sentenced to 5 years. 
 




 ‘Troubled’ individual angered at passport refusal 
 Made very public threats against ASIO and DFAT 
 Convicted on non-terrorism charges 
 
Mallah was born in Australia in 1983. In May 2001 he was refused a passport on grounds of 
national security, based on his extremist views. Over the next two-and-a-half years he courted 
media attention, saying he was planning an attack against the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) or ASIO. He was arrested in December 2003 and in April 2005 pleaded 
guilty to threatening to endanger the life of a Commonwealth official (having been acquitted 
of two terrorism charges). 
 




 Influenced by ‘recruiter’ Faheem Lodhi to train with LeT 
 Foreign organisational contact and overseas training 
 Kept notes of his activities plus downloaded jihadi literature 
 Dropped out of training and returned home 





 Charges dropped for legal reasons 
 
Ul-Haque was born in Pakistan, coming to Australia in his teens in 1998. In January 2003 
(arranged by Lodhi) he returned to Pakistan where he trained with LeT for three weeks. He 
returned to Australia in March and was arrested and charged in November with knowingly 
undergoing terrorist training. Charges were dropped after the conduct of ASIO officers was 
deemed inappropriate and the evidence inadmissible. 
 
  











 Brigitte: Came to Australia from abroad; Foreign organisational contact and overseas 
training; Deported to France in 2003; Convicted 2007 
 Lodhi: Recruiter in Australia; Foreign organisational affiliation; Convicted 2006 
 Direction from overseas ‘handler’ 
 Preparing for attack within Australia, including use of Internet to research targets 
 
Brigitte, a French resident, trained with LeT in Pakistan in 2001. In 2003, at the direction of 
his LeT contact Sajid Mir in Pakistan, he travelled to Sydney and teamed up with Lodhi. 
Brigitte was arrested and deported in October 2003 on a tip-off from French authorities, 
while Lodhi, allegedly LeT’s representative in Australia (resident since 1998) was arrested in 
April 2004. The two men had downloaded aerial photos of military sites and made enquiries 
about pre-cursor chemicals. Lodhi also obtained a restricted map of the Australian electrical 
grid, collected more than a hundred toilet rolls (which can be used for manufacturing the low 
explosive nitrocellulose), made notes on how to make explosives and had a ‘virtual library’ 
promoting jihad. Both men were separately convicted and sentenced to 9 (Brigitte) and 20 

















 Long-term Islamist activist 
 Repeated allegations of involvement with violent Islamists 
 Sentenced in absentia for terrorist activity in Lebanon 
 Use of Internet for distributing terrorist propaganda 
 Convicted in Australia in 2008 for making and distributing terrorist materials 
 
Born in Lebanon, Khazaal moved to Australia while in his mid-teens in 1986. He studied 
Islam diligently, founded the Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) in Sydney and worked as a 
journalist for the IYM’s controversial magazine, Nida’Ul Islam from 1994 onwards. The CIA 
claim that Khazaal trained in Afghanistan in 1998 where he met with bin Laden, and he has 
been accused of sending other recruits to Afghanistan and acting as al-Qaeda’s man in 
Australia. It has also been reported that he met with the infamous Abu Dahdah and Abu 
Qatada, and he was sentenced twice (in 2003 and 2005) in absentia in Lebanon for forming a 
terrorist organisation with the intention of carrying out attacks. Khazaal was arrested in 
Australia in June 2004 and later convicted for creating and posting an article online, 
‘Provisions on the Rules of Jihad - Short Judicial Rulings and Organisational Instructions for 
















 Australian-born extremist preacher 
 Made and distributed pro-jihadi video 
 Use of Internet to distribute propaganda 
 Left Australia but never charged 
 
Born in Sydney around 1970, Sheikh Mohammed headed the Global Islamic Youth Centre 
(GIYC) in Liverpool, west Sydney. In 2007 he was investigated by police for possible 
incitement of hatred following the discovery of videos he had made and distributed in 2004, 
in which he declared “Teach [children] this: that there is nothing more beloved to me than 
wanting to die as a mujahid...Put in their soft, tender heart the zeal of jihad and the love of 
martyrdom.” By this time he had been in Lebanon for around two years already (having left 
Australia days before the Pendennis raids- see below). No further action was taken but then 
Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd publicly announced at the time that Mohammed would not be 
welcome back in Australia.   
 
Case#11: The Melbourne ‘Pendennis’ Group: Abdul Nacer Benbrika, Aimen Joud, 
Fadl Sayadi, Abdullah Merhi, Ahmed Raad, Ezzit Raad, Amer Haddara, Izzydeen 




 ‘Spiritual’ leader: Abdul Nacer Benbrika 
 Secondary leaders: Joud and Sayadi 
 Use of criminal means to raise funds 
 One individual (Kent) with overseas terror training  





 Engaged in domestic training exercises 
 Use of Internet for downloading jihadist materials 
 Allegedly filmed potential targets but were not close to achieving attack capability 
 Communicated, met and trained with the Sydney Pendennis group 
 Infiltrated by an undercover officer, ‘Ahmet Sonmez’ 
 Convicted on terrorism charges in 2007  
 
Benbrika came to Australia from Algeria in 1989, settling in Melbourne. A self-taught 
‘sheikh’, he was affiliated for a time with controversial preacher Mohammed Omran, 
although he became more extreme and broke away to form his own group, beginning around 
2002. The immediate ‘hardcore’ group of followers around him were primarily of Lebanese 
descent and most swore bayat (an oath of allegiance) to him as they became increasingly 
absorbed by his exhortations of jihad. Striving to coerce the withdrawal of Australian troops 
from Iraq, they made concerted efforts (including a scheme to sell stolen car parts) to raise 
funds for the group to enable their violent aspirations. They also engaged in training exercises 
with a group of like-minded individuals in Sydney and allegedly conducted surveillance of 
possible targets for attack, although the Melbournians did not achieve attack capabilities.  
 The main wave of arrests (both in Melbourne and Sydney) took place on November 
8
th
 2005, one taking place on the 10
th
, and a final three on March 31
st
, 2006. Benbrika was 
charged with directing a terrorist organisation, and his followers in Melbourne were charged 
with combinations of intentionally belonging to a terrorist organisation, possessing items in 
preparation for a terrorist attack, and in some cases also providing resources (helping to direct 
activities and actively pursue funding for the group). Attik pleaded guilty in June 2007 and in 
September guilty verdicts were returned for Benbrika, Joud, Merhi, Ahmed and Ezzit Raad, 
Sayadi and Haddara. A no verdict was originally returned for Kent although he later pleaded 





guilty to making a document in preparation for an act of terrorism, whilst four others were 
found not guilty. Sentences (handed down in October 2009) ranged from 6 to 15 years.  
 
Case#12: The Sydney ‘Pendennis’ Group: Mohamed Elomar, Khaled Cheikho, 
Moustafa Cheikho, Abdul Rakib Hasan, Mohammad Omar Jamal, Omar Umar Sarif 




 Also deferred to Benbrika for spiritual guidance 
 Coordinated by Elomar, assisted by Khaled Cheikho 
 Several individuals with overseas training  
 Also engaged in domestic training, in collaboration with the Melbourne group 
 Use of Internet for downloading jihadist materials 
 Utilised criminal contacts 
 Amassed weapons and chemicals for domestic attack 
 Convicted on terrorism charges in 2009 
 
It is unclear exactly when and how the Sydney group came together, or how they made 
contact with the Melbourne group. The coordinating members, Elomar and the two Cheikhos, 
allegedly trained with LeT sometime between the late 1990’s and 2002. In December 2004 
Elomar, Hasan and Touma were stopped by police seemingly conducting surveillance of the 
Lucas Heights nuclear research facility near Sydney and in 2005 the group gathered pace 
moving towards acts of violence. Elomar allegedly bought several rocket launchers stolen 
from the army (which were never recovered), and when the police raids came in November 
2005, hundreds of litres of chemicals were found along with scores of detonators and digital 
timers suitable for manufacturing bombs. Twelve firearms and thousands of rounds of 





ammunition are also reported to have been found. The Sydney group faced more serious 
charges than their counterparts in Melbourne (conspiring in preparation for an attack, vs. 
membership of a terrorist organisation). Baladjam, Touma, Sharrouf and Mulahalilovic all 
pleaded guilty, receiving sentences from 3 to 14 years. Elomar, Khaled and Moustafa 
Cheikho, Hasan and Jamal were all convicted in October 2009 and in February 2010 were 
sentenced to 28, 27, 26, 26 and 23 years respectively.  
 




 Arrested in Kuwait 
 Foreign organisational affiliation 
 Convicted on terrorism charges in 2005 
 
Adrey came to Australia from Kuwait in 1997. He and his family (all Australian citizens) 
moved back to Kuwait in 2002.He was arrested along with 30 others in February 2005 and 
was accused of being a member of the Peninsula Lions, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group. 
He was sentenced to 4 years in jail in December 2005. 
 




 Killed fighting in Somalia 
 
Ahmed Ali, a Somali-Australian, had come to Australia with his parents in the late 1990’s, 
settling in Melbourne. He reportedly radicalised in Melbourne beginning around 2002 before 
leaving for Somalia in December 2006, taking his pregnant Australian-convert wife and child 





with him. He was killed on the front line, aged 25, battling with Ethiopian forces after being 
there for just three days. 
 




 Arrested in terror raids in Lebanon 
 Hadba charged with terrorism offences (including organisational affiliation) 
 
In June 2007 a series of raids took place in Lebanon in which a cache of weapons and 
military equipment was found. Approximately 90 men were arrested, among them several 
Westerners. Six Australians were among them: Omar Hadba, Ibrahim Sabouh, Hussein 
Elomar, Muhammad Basal, Bassam El Sayed and Ahmed Elomar. In March 2009 Hadba was 
committed to stand trial, accused of being a member of Fatah al-Islam, participating in killing 
military personnel and civilians and the manufacture of weapons for use in terror attacks in 
Lebanon. Sabouh was also reportedly charged but was not confirmed to stand trial, while 
Ahmed Elomar and Basal were released. No further information was released regarding El 
Sayed or Hussein Elomar.    
 





 Foreign travel, training and organisational affiliation 
 Planned fidayen attack on Australian military base 
 





Aweys, Sayed and two others who were acquitted were all arrested in police raids in August 
2009. Fattal had already been detained on an unrelated matter, while a sixth man believed to 
be part of the group, Walid Osman Mohammed was reported to be overseas in Somalia. Later 
reports alleged that another man, Hussein Hashi Hemed Farah, had acted as the plot 
‘mastermind’ and had escaped custody after being detained in Kenya. All are of Somali or 
Lebanese heritage with Australian passports and a number of individuals involved are 
believed to have travelled to Somalia to participate in training and combat, and to seek 
approval for their plans from the al-Shabaab terrorist organisation. Aweys, Sayed and Fattal 
were convicted in December 2010 for planning a fidayen operation at an Australian military 
base in Sydney, where they planned to attack with firearms until being killed themselves. 
They have yet to be sentenced at the time of writing. 
 
Cases Excluded from the Analysis (n = 9) 
 
1. Muhamed Mubayyid (...1997-2003...)98 
Key Features: 
 US-based charity with pro-jihad agenda 
 Use of Internet to promote overseas jihad and solicit funds 
 Terrorism financing implied but never charged 
 Convicted on non-terrorism charges in 2008 
  
A naturalised Australian citizen of Lebanese origin, Mubayyid was the Treasurer of Care 
International in the US, which was accused of financing mujahedin overseas. Mubayyid and 
colleague Emadeddin Muntasser were arrested in the US in 2005 and eventually convicted of 





tax fraud, however no terrorism charges were laid. Mubayid was sentenced to 11 months in 
prison in 2008 and deported to Sydney.  
 
2. Mamdouh Habib (...2001...)99 
 Key Features: 
 Stayed at al-Qaeda guest houses and met with other Australians 
 Detained in Pakistan and taken to Guantanamo Bay 
 Never charged; released in 2005 
 
Habib came to Australia from Egypt in 1980. He came to the attention of ASIO as an 
associate of Omar Abdel Rahman in 1993 and in June 2001 travelled to Pakistan. In October 
of that year he was arrested after admittedly spending time at an al-Qaeda guest house where 
he met David Hicks, Jack Thomas and Matthew Stewart. He was taken to Guantanamo Bay 
via Egypt and eventually released without charge and returned to Australia in January 2005.  
 
3. Sheikh Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud (...2004...)100 
Key Features: 
 Associate of Mohammed Omran and an alleged jihadi recruiter 
 Never charged 
 
In June 2004 it was reported that French authorities had named Sydney-based Zoud (a close 
associate of Mohammed Omran) as a recruiter for jihad, based on information provided by 
Willie Brigitte. Zoud is alleged to have performed Brigitte’s wedding ceremony in Sydney 
and to have met with Jack Thomas and Abu Bakar Bashir. He denied the allegations and no 
action was taken. 






4. Matthew Stewart (...2005...)101 
Key Features: 
 Alleged appearance in jihadi propaganda video 
 Foreign organisational affiliation and training 
 
An Australian ex-soldier who left the army in 2001, it has been alleged that Stewart is the 
figure who appeared in a 2005 jihadi video threatening attacks on the West. It was also 
reported in 2007 that he had been identified at an al-Qaeda affiliated training camp in 
Pakistan. Authorities have confirmed nothing except that he is a person of interest. 
  
5. Hassan Kalache and Jill Courtney (...2006...)102 
Key Features: 
 Discussed plan to bomb King’s Cross in Sydney 
 Case dropped in 2008 
 
In 2006 Courtney and Kalache (who was already in prison serving a sentence for murder) 
were charged with conspiring to cause an explosion at Kings Cross in Sydney, based on 
intercepted phone conversations between them. The case was thrown out of court in March 
2008. 
 
6. John Howard Amundsen (...2006...)103 
Key Features: 
 ‘Troubled’ individual, constructed bombs 
 Book on bin Laden found 





 Angry at girlfriend’s parents, psychologically disturbed 
 Convicted on non-terrorism charges 
 
Amundsen’s home in Brisbane was raided in May 2006, where police found home-made 
explosives and a book on bin Laden. However, it emerged that he was suffering from mental 
health issues and had planned to plant the bombs outside his girlfriend’s parents’ work-
places. He was sentenced to 6 years in 2008 for non-terrorism charges. 
 
7. Warye Kanie (...2006...)104 
Key Features: 
 Detained in Iraq on suspicion of terrorism 
 Released without charge in 2007 
 
An Iraqi Kurd, Kanie came to Australia in 2003 and gained citizenship in 2005. In July 2006 
he travelled back to Iraq and in October he was detained on suspicion of terrorism. He was 
released without charge in July 2007. 
 
8. Muhammad Ayub, Abdullah Ayub and Marat Sumolsky (...2006...)105 
Key Features: 
 Arrested in terror-raids in Yemen 
 Released without charge in 2006 
 
The Ayub brothers (Abdul Rahim’s sons) and Polish-born convert Sumolsky were detained in 
Yemen in October 2006 along with around 20 others. They were originally charged with 





arms smuggling and fundraising for terrorists but the Ayubs were released in December 2006 
while Sumolsky’s freedom was reported to be imminent. 
 
9. Mohamed Haneef (...2007...)106 
Key Features: 
 Associated with Islamist terrorists in the UK 
 Suspicious activity regarding plans to flee to India 
 Charges dropped in 2007 
 
Indian-born Haneef was arrested in Queensland in July 2007 as part of the UK investigation 




 of that year. He had 
been associated with the individuals responsible for the attempted attacks in the UK and 
appeared to be fleeing the country. He was originally charged with recklessly supplying 
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